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1 Introduction
A large empirical literature has examined whether foreign presence in an
industry gives rise to productivity spillovers to local firms in the same in-
dustry. A recent survey by Görg and Greenaway (2004) suggests that the
literature on so-called intra-industry spillovers has not come up with a clear-
cut answer.1 A reason put forward is that multinational enterprises (MNEs),
in addition to being potential sources of knowledge spillovers, are potential
sources of competition. While a positive eﬀect of foreign presence on host
country firms is usually interpreted as evidence of knowledge diﬀusion or
technology transfer, the possibility that competition could also be at work
when a positive spillover eﬀect is observed is often overlooked. Entry of new
and eﬃcient firms that increase product market competition, may enhance
productivity in domestic firms by forcing them to reduce x-ineﬃciencies or
to adopt new technologies faster than they otherwise would. Bartelsman et
al. (2004) provide evidence of this Schumpeterian argument for a number of
developed and developing countries; they find a positive correlation between
turnover rates and productivity growth of incumbents. More directly, Aghion
et al. (2005) demonstrate that foreign entry in the UK increases the incen-
tives of firms to innovate in order to survive the increased competition. Of
course, such a positive impact of foreign competition on host country firms
may take time to materialise, see Sembenelli and Siotis (2005) for evidence
from Spain. In the short run at least, foreign firms are equally likely to steal
market shares from domestic firms and, thereby, force them up their average
cost curves. This implies that the measured productivity of domestic firms
will be lower and we will observe a negative eﬀect from foreign entry (Aitken
and Harrison (1999)).
Traditionally, the spillover-literature has measured foreign presence as the
share of industry employment in foreign-owned firms, which represents the
accumulated foreign direct investments (FDI) in the sector. This measure
combines new foreign entrants with foreign-owned firms that have been in the
market for some time. We argue that a change in competitive pressure due
to foreign presence should primarily come from new foreign entrants, and
not from foreign-owned firms that have already established their position
in a sector. In turn, if knowledge externalities take time to materialise,
spillovers are more likely to originate from foreign firms that have been in the
market for a while. Our argument implies that the estimated eﬀects of overall
1Among more recent studies, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find a negative eﬀect for
Venezuela, as does Konings (2001) for Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, and Djankov and
Hoeckman (2000) for the Czech republic. On the other hand Haskel et al. (2002) and Keller
and Yeaple (2002) find evidence of positive spillovers for the UK and the US, respectively.
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foreign presence on domestic productivity could conceal very diﬀerent eﬀects
from new foreign entrants and existing foreign firms. To investigate this, we
decompose the usual measure of foreign presence into one term representing
the existing foreign-owned firms in a sector and another term representing
the new foreign entrants. Once we focus explicitly on the recent foreign
entrants, we are also able to take account of the fact that foreign ownership
can come about either by greenfield entry or by foreign acquisition of assets
in existing domestic firms.
There are several reasons to suggest that the competition eﬀect of foreign
entry and the potential for spillovers from foreign entry may diﬀer according
to the mode of entry. We address diﬀerences in the potential for spillovers
first. On the one hand, domestic firms acquired by foreign owners are likely
to be more integrated in the host country economy than greenfield entrants;
hence, the existing linkages with other local firms may serve as a channel
for spillovers. On the other hand, if the most eﬃcient foreign investors are
more likely to choose greenfield entry2, the new knowledge stock that forms
the basis for potential spillovers may be larger with greenfield entry than
with foreign acquisitions. Regarding possible competition eﬀects, the likely
diﬀerences between greenfield and acquisition entry derive from the way these
two alternatives aﬀect industry market structure.3 While greenfield entry
increases production capacity and therefore also competition, acquisitions do
not necessarily have an immediate impact on market structure. Moreover,
competition or eﬃciency-enhancing eﬀects may take longer to materialise if
an acquisition involves substantial restructuring in the acquired plant.
Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether the mode of foreign entry
matters for the eﬀects FDI has on host country firms. The approach is in
the spirit of the spillover literature, where there have not been studies distin-
guishing between the recent foreign entrants and the existing foreign firms or
between diﬀerent modes of entry. There have, however, been previous eﬀorts
to refine the spillover question by splitting FDI into diﬀerent subgroups. One
example is studies examining whether the degree of ownership matters for the
extent of spillovers from FDI (e.g. Blomström and Sjöholm (1999), Dimelis
and Louri (2002) and Smarzynska Javorcik and Spatareanu (2003)). Another
example are eﬀorts to distinguish between technology sourcing and technol-
ogy exploitation as motives for FDI (Driﬃeld and Love (2002), Driﬃeld et al.
(2005)).4 And finally, Castellani and Zanfei (2005) look into the importance
2See Smarzynska Javorcik and Saggi (2004) for a theoretical argument and empirical
evidence.
3See e.g. UNCTAD (2000, p.145) for an informal description and Haller (2005) for a
more formal exposition.
4The argument that the motivation for FDI may matter for spillovers goes back to
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of firm heterogeneity in terms of the markets they serve for generating and
absorbing spillovers.
We use a large panel data set of Norwegian manufacturing industries for
the period 1978-2001. Our results from estimating an augmented production
function suggest that a change in foreign presence measured as the change
in the share of overall employment in foreign-owned plants relative to total
employment in a sector, has a significant but small positive eﬀect on the
productivity growth of domestic firms in low-concentration sectors. When
we specifically account for the change in foreign presence due to both green-
field entry and foreign acquisitions, we find opposite eﬀects of the two modes
of entry. The impact of greenfield entry on domestic productivity growth
is negative and seems to be caused by domestic plants not adjusting their
use of inputs (in particular labour) when reducing their output due to mar-
ket share losses. Thus, greenfield entry can be associated with a negative
competition eﬀect. In contrast, we find a positive and significant eﬀect of
foreign acquisitions in low-concentration sectors. This suggests that existing
linkages between the acquired plant and other domestic plants may facilitate
knowledge spillovers. There seems to be no eﬀect of recent foreign entry
on the productivity growth of domestic plants in high-concentration sectors.
Our results are robust to a number of diﬀerent specifications.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
discuss our strategy for estimating the impact from greenfield entry and
entry by acquisition on the productivity of domestic firms. In Section 3 we
describe the data sources and give an overview of the development of foreign
ownership and foreign entry in Norwegian manufacturing. We present our
results in Section 4, and examine their robustness in Section 5. Section 6
briefly concludes.
2 Empirical specification
In order to examine the impact of foreign presence and diﬀerent modes of
foreign entry on the productivity of domestic firms, we use an approach
commonly adopted in the spillover literature and start with an augmented
Fosfuri and Motta (1999), who demonstrate in a theoretical model that MNEs without
firm specific advantages may have technology sourcing motives for FDI. If technology
sourcing is the motive for FDI, one should not expect spillovers.
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production function of the following form
lnYit = βK lnKit + βM lnMit + βH lnHit (1)
+
TP
k=0
βkFPI,t−k + γZit + υi + υt + εit.
In equation (1) lnY , lnK, lnM , and lnH are the natural logs of output,
capital, hours and materials in plant i, year t.5 FPI,t−k captures foreign
presence at the 5-digit industry level and Z includes a set of competition
variables. υi and υt are plant and time specific eﬀects.
We employ a set of variables similar to those first proposed by Nick-
ell (1996) to control for competition. These include industry concentration
(CR5It), market share (MSit), profit margin (PMit) and a measure of open-
ness (OPENIt). As our concentration measure we use the sum of market
shares of the five largest plants defined at the 5-digit industry level.6 Tech-
nological diﬀerences across industries imply very diﬀerent requirements in
terms of size and scale for firms to be able to operate in their respective
environments, see Sutton (1996). High market shares, therefore, need not in-
dicate a lack of competition. However, as argued by Nickell (1996), changes
in market structure over time are still going to be reasonably good measures
of changes in competition. The profit margin measure (PMit) is thought
to capture possible rents that may be available to shareholders and work-
ers in the form of higher pay and lower eﬀort. The expected signs on the
concentration measure, market share and profit margin are negative: higher
profit margins allow scope for lower eﬀort and thus lower productivity, and
higher market shares or concentration ratios are associated with lower eﬀort
and productivity levels. As higher eﬃciency would raise both profit margins
and market shares, these variables are potentially endogenous, which could
result in positive coeﬃcients. We follow Haskel et al. (2002) and Disney
et al. (2004) and address this problem by lagging both measures. We use
one-period lags and note that endogeneity gives rise to an upward bias in the
estimated coeﬃcients. The variable OPENIt is defined as imports over the
sum of exports and imports, and the idea is that increased import competi-
tion acts as a disciplining force that has a positive eﬀect on productivity.7
5The definitions of input and output rely to a large extent on previous work with this
data, e.g. Griliches and Ringstad (1971), Simpson (1994), Møen (1998) and Klette (1999).
For the construction of all variables, see the variable definitions in the Appendix.
6We have 132 5-digit sectors in our estimations.
7Due to data limitations, OPENIt is defined at the 3-digit industry level. We also
experimented with the import penetration ratio (imports divided by domestic consump-
tion) as an alternative measure, and our results are not sensitive to which measure of
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Bartelsman et al. (2004) find a positive correlation between turnover
rates and productivity growth of incumbents, which suggests that industries
with a high turnover of firms are characterised by higher productivity. Thus,
as an additional control variable we use the sum of entry and exit rates as
a measure of gross turnover in the industry (TurnoverIt). We also lag this
variable by one period due to possible endogeneity. Turnover is also likely to
be a good measure of industry-specific business cycles since entry and exit
are closely correlated with the business cycle.
In equation (1), FPIt is the variable of main interest. In line with the
previous spillover literature, in our first specification we take the variable
to represent the overall stock of foreign presence measured as the share of
industry employment in foreign-owned plants at the 5-digit ISIC level:
FPIt =
P
i∈FOIt
(Empl)it
(Total empl)It
, (2)
where FOIt is the set of all foreign-owned plants in sector I, year t. As the
eﬀects from foreign presence may take time to materialise, we include 2 lags
of foreign presence in our estimations. We experimented with diﬀerent lag
structures; more than two lags were not significant in any of our regressions.
To eliminate plant and industry specific eﬀects we estimate equation (1)
in first diﬀerences8, thus our regression equation is
∆ lnYit = αK∆ lnKit + αM∆ lnMit + αH∆ lnHit (3)
+
2P
k=0
βk1∆FPI,t−k + γ1∆MSi,t−1 + γ2∆PMi,t−1
+ γ3∆CR5I,t + γ4∆OPENI,t + γ5TurnoverI,t−1
+ υt + ξit.
import competition we use. We feel more comfortable using OPENIt as we do not need
to combine diﬀerent data sources for its construction.
8An alternative method to eliminate unobserved plant specific eﬀects is to use fixed ef-
fects estimation (within-transformation). The choice between these estimation strategies
hinges on the properties of the idiosyncratic error term in equation (1). Fixed eﬀects is
eﬃcient if the idiosyncratic error terms are not serially correlated, which implies that the
within-transformed error terms should be negatively correlated. The residuals (excluding
the plant specific eﬀect) from a fixed eﬀects estimation of (1) exhibit positive autocor-
relation with an estimated ρ of 0.37. First diﬀerencing is eﬃcient if the first-diﬀerenced
error terms are not serially correlated. In our case, the residuals from the first-diﬀerenced
equation (3) exhibit weak negative serial correlation with an estimated ρ of -0.17. These
properties of the residuals support the choice of using first diﬀerences as our method of
eliminating plant specific eﬀects.
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We estimate equation (3) on the sample of firms that are Norwegian owned
throughout their presence in our panel. In all our regressions, we include year
dummies to control for common year specific shocks to all manufacturing
plants, and industry dummies (3-digit level) to account for industry specific
linear time trends in the levels of the dependent variable.
∆FPIt represents the change in foreign presence in the industry from t−1
to t given as
∆FPIt =
P
i∈FOIt
(Empl)it
(Total empl)It
−
P
i∈FOI,t−1
(Empl)i,t−1
(Total empl)I,t−1
, (4)
where FOIt is the set of foreign-owned plants in industry I at time t. A
change in foreign presence can come about by greenfield entry of foreign
plants, foreign acquisitions, employment expansion or contraction in existing
foreign-owned firms, and also by withdrawal of foreign-owned firms through
divestures or plant closures. To the extent that the eﬀect of recent entrants is
diﬀerent from that of long established foreign-owned firms, empirical studies
of spillovers from FDI which use the overall foreign presence measure may
generate ambiguous results because the measure is a combination of these
diﬀerent causes of change in foreign presence. In particular, when discussing
the possible competition eﬀects of FDI, we argue that one should pay at-
tention to the recent foreign entrants. Sembenelli and Siotis (2005), in their
analysis of the eﬀect of FDI on the price cost margins of Spanish firms, in-
terpret the negative short-term eﬀects of foreign presence as a competition
eﬀect and longer-term positive eﬀects as spillovers. As their measure of for-
eign presence captures the stock of FDI in the sector, they are not able to
explicitly identify the impact of the recent foreign entrants. The same caveat
applies to Aghion et al. (2004): in their study of entry and productivity
growth in the UK, they associate foreign entry with the first diﬀerence of
overall foreign presence.
Thus, in our second specification we proceed to isolate the impact of the
recent foreign entrants on the productivity of domestic plants. Although the
overall change in foreign presence ∆FPIt could be caused by many factors,
we focus here on greenfield and acquisition entry, and group the remaining
possible changes into one term. The set of foreign-owned firms FOIt at time
t can be split into the sets of greenfield entrants (GEIt), acquisition entrants
(AEIt), and the set of remaining foreign-owned plants that have been present
in the sector for at least one year (FO1It), thus FOIt = GEIt∪AEIt∪FO1It.
Using these definitions of the diﬀerent groups of foreign plants in year t, we
can rewrite equation (4) in the following way
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∆FPIt =
P
i∈GEIt
(Empl)it
(Total empl)It
+
P
i∈AEIt
(Empl)it
(Total empl)It
(5)
+
⎛
⎜⎝
P
i∈FO1It
(Empl)it
(Total empl)It
−
P
i∈FOI,t−1
(Empl)i,t−1
(Total empl)I,t−1
⎞
⎟⎠
≡ GIt +AIt +∆FIt.
The first term GIt in equation (5) represents the change in foreign pres-
ence between t − 1 and t that is attributable to greenfield entry. It is the
employment-weighted greenfield entry rate; i.e. the sum of employment in
those plants in industry I that are greenfield entrants in year t expressed as
a share of total employment in the industry that year. Similarly, AIt rep-
resents the change in foreign presence due to foreign acquisitions; i.e. the
employment share of plants in industry I that are acquired by foreign own-
ers between t− 1 and t. GIt and AIt represent the flow of new FDI into the
sector diﬀerentiated by the mode of entry. The last term∆FIt equals the two
terms in brackets, and represents the remaining change in foreign presence
between t− 1 and t. ∆FIt captures employment expansion or contraction of
existing foreign-owned firms relative to total industry employment, and also
withdrawal of foreign firms through divestures or plant closures.
As the variables of main interest are foreign presence and foreign entry,
we should take into account that the estimated relationship between these
variables and productivity could be biased by selection on survival. Sup-
pose for example, that foreign greenfield entry occurs primarily in sectors
with good market growth prospects. In such sectors, even low productivity
firms may survive, creating a negative correlation between foreign entry and
productivity among surviving firms. Conversely, if foreign entry increases
competitive pressure such that only the best firms survive, there will be a
positive correlation between foreign entry and productivity among surviving
firms. Thus, the selection bias could work in both directions and the overall
bias is not known. To address this potential problem we use a Heckman se-
lection model as one of our specifications when estimating equation (3) with
both (4) or (5) representing the change in foreign presence.
The eﬀect of a change in foreign presence on productivity growth may
depend on the market structure of the industry. On the one hand, it could
be argued that information about new technologies may spread more easily
in a small and transparent market. This would imply that spillovers may be
larger in concentrated industries. On the other hand, greenfield entry in a
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concentrated industry may have a larger impact on the competitive pressure
in the industry than greenfield entry in a less concentrated industry. At
least in the short run, this could lead to reduced domestic market shares
or even a reduction in output prices. A similar eﬀect might be generated
if a foreign acquisition in a concentrated industry puts an end to collusive
behaviour in that industry. To take account of the possibility that the eﬀect
of foreign entry may depend on the market structure of an industry, one
of our specifications includes interaction terms and lagged interaction terms
between the change-in-foreign-presence variable(s) under consideration and
the 5-firm concentration measure.
3 Data
Our main data source is the annual census of all Norwegian manufacturing
plants collected by Statistics Norway. The Norwegian Manufacturing Statis-
tics are collected at the plant level, where the plant is defined as a functional
unit at a single physical location, engaged mainly in activities within a spe-
cific activity group. The plant-level variables include detailed information on
production, input use, investment, location, and industry classification. We
use the ISIC Rev. 2 industry classification in our analysis.9
We drop plants with less than 8 employees throughout their lives, and
observations of plants not in ordinary production (service units or plants
under construction).10 The resulting sample contains 150,000 observations
from 10,400 plants for the period 1978-2001, with an average plant size of 43
employees. In terms of employment and output, the sample contains more
than 90% of total manufacturing output and employment.
Information about foreign ownership for the period 1990-2001 is obtained
from the SIFON-register, which is a record of foreign ownership of equity in
Norwegian firms. The SIFON-register contains information about the value
and share of equity held by the largest foreign owner of the firm, the to-
tal share of equity held by foreign owners and the country of origin of the
largest owner.11 The register was initiated in 1972, and while only direct
foreign ownership was recorded before 1990, from 1990 onwards also indirect
9For more detailed descriptions of the Manufacturing Statistics, see the documentation
in Halvorsen et al. (1991) and Møen (2004).
10In addition, we drop plants that in the Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics are classi-
fied as "small" (defined as having less than 5 or 10 employees) throughout their life. The
information for these plants comes mainly from administrative registers and is therefore
less extensive than for large plants. In particular, there is no investment information,
which means that we are unable to construct capital measures for this group.
11See Simpson (1994) for more details about the SIFON-register.
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foreign ownership is documented.12 Before 1990, the Manufacturing Sta-
tistics contains a variable where plants are classified into three ownership
classes; plants that are part of firms where less than 20%, between 20-50%,
or more than 50% of the equity is directly foreign owned. This information
is obtained from earlier versions of the SIFON-register. We have chosen to
treat indirect and direct foreign ownership equally after 1990, which means
that we classify plants as foreign owned when either the direct or the indirect
foreign ownership of equity is above the 20% threshold.13
It is likely that registration of indirect foreign ownership in 1990 was
somewhat incomplete as this was the first year when this type of foreign
ownership was recorded. It is also likely that the degree of underreporting
of indirect foreign ownership declined during the early 1990s. Figure 1 il-
lustrates the development of foreign ownership in our sample, and shows a
dramatic increase in foreign presence during the 1990s. This increase in for-
eign presence is a combination of a trend increase in foreign ownership as
well as a result of the extended definition and recording of foreign owner-
ship. The rate of increase in the number of indirectly foreign-owned plants
during the 1990s was higher than that of directly foreign-owned plants, and
by 2001 the number of indirectly foreign-owned plants exceeded the number
of plants with direct foreign ownership interests. Global trends in corporate
ownership structures may partly explain this shift towards indirect foreign
ownership, but it is unlikely that indirect foreign ownership in Norwegian
manufacturing was nonexistent during the 1980s. Thus, our sample is likely
to underestimate the extent of foreign ownership before the early 1990s.
In the Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics each plant is assigned an iden-
tification number which it keeps throughout its life. A plant will even keep
its previous identification number when it re-enters the panel after a time
of inactivity as long as production restarts in the same geographic location.
Mergers or buy-outs at the firm level do not aﬀect the plant identification
code. Since our data are from a census, we avoid the problem of possible
false entries and exits due to plants not being sampled.
When defining entry and exit our main concern is the treatment of plants
that are present in the panel for one or more years and then absent for some
years before they reappear in the panel again. Although the logic of the
census would imply that a plant is not in operation if it is not observed in
the census, we assume that when a plant is missing from the census for one
12A firm has direct foreign ownership interests if foreigners own part of the equity of the
firm. Firms of which 50% or more is owned by another firm based in Norway (mother),
and where the foreign equity stakes are in the mother, are classified as indirectly foreign
owned.
13We report how this aﬀects our results in the robustness analysis in section 5.
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Figure 1: Foreign presence in Norwegian manufacturing
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The figure is based on the sample of large plants.
or two consecutive years, this is due to lack of registration rather than a
temporary closure. When a plant disappears for three or more consecutive
years before it reappears in the census, we regard it as temporarily closed
and thus count an extra exit and entry for that plant. We also define as
temporarily closed those plants that are missing for two consecutive years,
but reappear with a new owner (a new firm identification number). Thus we
define a plant as an entrant in year t if it appears for the first time in year t,
or reappears in that year after a temporary closure. Similarly we define an
exit in year t if the plant is present in year t and temporarily closed in t+1,
or absent all subsequent years.14
In Table 1 we show the average annual number of foreign and domestic
plants per 5 year period during the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the average
yearly greenfield entry and acquisition numbers. Figure 2 then displays the
net foreign and domestic entry rates, and the net foreign acquisition rate,
calculated for overlapping 5 year periods. The foreign net entry rate is very
small for the whole period, while the domestic net entry rate is negative,
with a peak in exits during the recession in the early 1990s. This creates a
trough in the net entry rate. The negative net entry rate reflects the overall
trend in the economy of moving resources out of manufacturing into the
services sector. During the period of analysis the number of observations
14Less than 2.5% of the plants in the sample have what we define as temporary closures.
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Table 1: Annual number of foreign and domestic plants and foreign
entrants
Domestic Foreign Greenfield Acquisition
plants plants entry entry
1980-84 6,914 225 5 24
1985-89 6,492 223 8 35
1990-94 5,445 400 14 103
1995-99 4,775 590 24 91
Note: Averages over 5-year periods.
in our sample decreased from 6,990 in 1978 to 4,850 in 2001. During the
same period total manufacturing employment declined by 33% from 330,000
in 1978 to 220,000 in 2001.15 By comparing the development in foreign
acquisitions with the foreign and domestic net entry rates in Figure 2, we can
conclude that the increase in foreign presence in Norwegian manufacturing
over the last 25 years is mainly due to net exit of domestic plants and foreign
acquisitions of domestic plants.
For the econometric analysis we clean the data with respect to missing
observations and outliers.16 First, we drop plants with missing information on
inputs or output for 80% or more of their life. We then drop observations with
negative profit margins and negative value added. We also exclude sector
342, "Printing, publishing and allied industries" from our sample. Klette
(1999), in his estimations of markups and scale parameters using the same
data, concluded that the results from this sector were implausible and should
be ignored. The printing sector has experienced a dramatic technological
change over the period: it went from manual typesetting to computerized
printing. Thus, the changes in this sector may be so large that results are
not representative. Alternatively, there may be particular data problems
aﬀecting productivity estimates for the printing and publishing sector. When
we include this sector, the results - except for the foreign presence (FP )
15Haskel et al. (2002) report a similar trend for UK manufacturing employment, a
decline of 36% from 1980 to 1992.
16We experimented with several cleaning procedures. In one alternative we define multi-
ple outliers on plant level changes in output, materials use and hours from one year to the
next according to the method by Hadi (1994), and defined as outliers all observations in
the 1st and 99th percentile. In another alternative, we defined as outliers all observations
with cost shares of capital, materials, or labour in the 1st and 99th percentile of observa-
tions for each year and 3-digit industry. All cleaning procedures drop observations evenly
across 2-digit industries, and drop more observations after 1995. The main conclusions in
section 4 hold for all cleaning procedures.
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Figure 2: Net foreign and domestic entry rates
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variable - go in the same direction as our main results in Section 4, but the
coeﬃcients are 2-3 times as large. By excluding the printing sector (ISIC
342), we are thus making it more diﬃcult for ourselves to obtain significant
results.
Our cleaned sample contains 112,000 observations from 9,110 plants. This
constitutes 75% of our initial sample from 1978-2001. Average plant size is
almost the same (it increases from 43.0 to 43.9 employees), and the share of
foreign plants is virtually unaﬀected. The number of plants per year in our
cleaned sample is 5,410 in 1978, down to 3,630 in 2001.
4 Results
We estimate the first-diﬀerenced equation (3) on those plants that are Nor-
wegian owned throughout their presence in our sample. Summary statistics
of the regression variables for the domestic plants sample are presented in
Table 6 in the Appendix. The results of estimating equation (3) using the
overall change in foreign presence as defined in equation (4) are presented in
the first column of Table 2. All inputs are significant. The coeﬃcients on
market share, concentration, and profit margin have the expected negative
sign. This indicates that reduced competitive pressure has a negative eﬀect
on productivity, although the concentration index is only significant at the
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10% level. The measure of openness has a positive coeﬃcient, hence higher
imports enhance domestic productivity, while the turnover rate is not signifi-
cant. The change in overall foreign presence is entered with its current value
and two lags. Only the coeﬃcient on the current change in foreign presence
is significantly diﬀerent from zero and has a positive sign, but the eﬀect is
small. In the row with
P
∆FP we sum the three coeﬃcients on the change
in foreign presence: their accumulated eﬀect is positive, but not significant.
This is in line with previous results for Norway reported by Grünfeld (2002).
As argued in section 2, the eﬀect of a change in foreign presence on pro-
ductivity growth may depend on the market structure of the industry. Thus,
in column 2 we include interaction terms between the 5-firm concentration
measure and the change in foreign presence. This gives an indication of
whether a change in foreign presence in concentrated sectors has a diﬀerent
eﬀect from a change in foreign presence in less concentrated sectors. Includ-
ing the interaction terms results in a significant and positive accumulated
eﬀect. The signs of the interaction terms go in opposite directions. In order
to investigate these eﬀects further, we split our sample at the median con-
centration level and run the regression of column 1 in Table 2 on these two
samples separately. These results show a positive eﬀect of foreign presence
in low-concentration sectors, and no significant eﬀect of foreign presence in
high-concentration sectors.17
By virtue of observability, our sample consists only of those plants that
survive. Hence, if foreign presence aﬀects the probability of survival, our
earlier estimates may be biased. In the last column of Table 2 we re-estimate
column 2 using the 2-step Heckman selection procedure where survival is
conditioned on investment and capital, see e.g. Haskel et al. (2002). This is
to capture the idea that investment which is observable but not correlated
with current output can pick up unobservable shocks to productivity. It
can be considered a "reduced" form of the more structural approach to the
exit decision taken in Olley and Pakes (1996). In this equation, selection is
determined by the plants’ investment shares18 and capital in logs, each from
levels up to their 4th powers. The results are very similar to those in column
2 without the selection correction. The variables in the selection probit are
17The sum of the three coeﬃcients on the change in foreign presence is 0.108 with
p-value 0.009 in the low-concentration sectors (sectors with CR5It < 0.25) and in
high-concentration sectors the eﬀect is 0.009 with p-value 0.628. Using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index as an alternative concentration measure in the regressions of Table 2
gives very much the same results.
18As zeros in investment are meaningful observations (see Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003)
for Norway), we prefer to scale investment by dividing by annual averages instead of taking
logs.
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Table 2: Foreign Presence and Domestic Productivity
Dependent variable ∆ lnYit
(1) (2) (selection)
∆ lnKit .058 (.003)∗∗ .058 (.003)∗∗ .055 (.003)∗∗
∆ lnMit .520 (.005)∗∗ .520 (.005)∗∗ .528 (.005)∗∗
∆ lnHit .290 (.007)∗∗ .290 (.007)∗∗ .281 (.006)∗∗
∆MSi,t−1 −.332 (.065)∗∗ −.332 (.065)∗∗ −.298 (.064)∗∗
∆PMi,t−1 −.375 (.009)∗∗ −.375 (.009)∗∗ −.378 (.009)∗∗
∆CR5I,t −.025 (.014)(∗) −.026 (.014)(∗) −.021 (.014)
∆OPENI,t .074 (.018)∗∗ .074 (.018)∗∗ .070 (.018)∗∗
TurnoverI,t−1 .015 (.013) .015 (.013) .025 (.013)∗
∆FPI,t .021 (.009)∗ .036 (.024) .034 (.023)
∆FPI,t−1 −.001 (.010) −.006 (.027) .013 (.028)
∆FPI,t−2 .005 (.009) .056 (.026)∗ .048 (.026)∗
(∆FP ∗ CR5)I,t −.024 (.035) −.021 (.035)
(∆FP ∗ CR5)I,t−1 .008 (.041) −.025 (.041)
(∆FP ∗ CR5)I,t−2 −.086 (.038)∗ −.062 (.040)P
∆FPI
[p−value]
.026
[.125]
.086
[.044]
.094
[.025]
R2 .79 .79 −
χ2 (1)
ρ(SE)
− − 11.54
−.049(.014)
N 61, 929 61, 929 63, 623
Plants 6, 558 6, 558 6, 558
Notes: ∗∗,∗ ,(∗) indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Year and
3-digit industry dummies included in all regressions. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the plant level in round parentheses.
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jointly significant, as indicated by the χ2 value. The selection term ρ is also
significant. We also tried to condition survival on a probit of so-called hazard
variables that have been found to determine exit, see e.g. Bernard and Jensen
(2002). The hazard variables are plant age, age squared, plant size (measured
as the number of employees), labour productivity, a multiplant dummy that
takes value one if the plant is part of a multiplant firm, and foreign presence.
This selection equation yields similar results.
As argued earlier, the measure of foreign presence used combines the
eﬀects from recent foreign entrants and employment changes in longer-term
foreign firms. In addition, the measure is not able to distinguish between
diﬀerent modes of foreign entry. Thus, we proceed by splitting the overall
change in foreign presence according to equation (5). Results are presented
in Table 3. The estimated coeﬃcients on the input and competition variables
do not change much when we split the change in foreign presence variable,
thus the coeﬃcients on inputs and competition variables are not reported.
In column 1 of Table 3 the coeﬃcients on greenfield entry are negative,
with the first lag of greenfield entry being significant. Their accumulated
eﬀect is negative and significant at the 5% level. Regarding acquisitions,
only the current foreign acquisition rate is significant with a positive sign.
The accumulated eﬀect of foreign acquisitions is positive and significant at
the 10% level, but it is small in economic terms. The eﬀect of the remaining
change in foreign presence ∆FI is close to zero and insignificant.
In column 2, we add the interaction terms between the components of
change in foreign presence and concentration in order to investigate whether
the eﬀects of foreign entry on productivity growth diﬀer according to the level
of industry concentration. The coeﬃcients on current greenfield entry and
its first lag are negative and significant; and their accumulated eﬀect is sub-
stantially larger in absolute terms than in column 1. The interaction terms
between greenfield entry (and lagged greenfield entry) and the concentration
measure are positive and significant. This suggests that the negative eﬀect of
foreign entry is particularly strong in less concentrated industries. Industries
with high levels of concentration are hardly aﬀected at all, indicating that
plants in these sectors are better able to face the increase in competition
from foreign greenfield entry.
In the case of foreign acquisitions, the coeﬃcients on the acquisition rate
are positive in column 2 but, as in column 1, only the coeﬃcient on the
current acquisition rate is significant. The positive accumulated eﬀect of
acquisitions is significant at the 1% level, and as in the case of greenfield
entry, the eﬀect is substantially larger in absolute terms than in column 1.
The interactions between the acquisition terms and the concentration index
are negative, suggesting that in highly concentrated industries acquisitions
16
Table 3: Modes of Foreign Entry and Domestic Productivity
Dependent variable ∆ lnYit
(1) (2) (selection)
GI,t −.040 (.061) −.399 (.196)∗ −.508 (.202)∗∗
GI,t−1 −.100 (.050)∗ −.687 (.195)∗∗ −.666 (.204)∗∗
GI,t−2 −.043 (.054) .007 (.223) −.167 (.223)
AI,t .032 (.012)∗∗ .082 (.031)∗∗ .079 (.031)∗∗
AI,t−1 .002 (.013) .052 (.034) .048 (.034)
AI,t−2 .002 (.014) .055 (.035) .063 (.036)(∗)
∆FI,t .013 (.017) −.008 (.042) −.011 (.041)
∆FI,t−1 .007 (.017) −.039 (.047) .022 (.047)
∆FI,t−2 .005 (.015) .051 (.043) .013 (.044)
(G ∗ CR5)I,t .497 (.260)(∗) .653 (.269)∗∗
(G ∗ CR5)I,t−1 .812 (.243)∗∗ .785 (.253)∗∗
(G ∗ CR5)I,t−2 −.064 (.285) .161 (.289)
(A ∗ CR5)I,t −.083 (.046)(∗) −.081 (.045)(∗)
(A ∗ CR5)I,t−1 −.084 (.051)(∗) −.081 (.051)
(A ∗ CR5)I,t−2 −.092 (.053)(∗) −.100 (.053)(∗)
(∆F ∗ CR5)I,t .040 (.064) .048 (.062)
(∆F ∗ CR5)I,t−1 .082 (.073) −.013 (.072)
(∆F ∗ CR5)I,t−2 −.072 (.066) .007 (.068)P
GI
[p−value]
−.183
[.054]
−1.079
[.000]
−1.341
[.000]P
AI
[p−value]
.036
[.065]
.190
[.000]
.190
[.000]P
∆FI
[p−value]
.025
[.311]
.003
[.961]
.024
[.716]
R2 .79 .79 −
χ2 (1)
ρ(SE)
− − 11.16
−.049(.015)
N 61, 929 61, 929 63, 623
Plants 6, 558 6, 558 6, 558
Notes: ∗∗,∗ ,(∗) indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Input
coeﬃcients not reported. Year and 3-digit industry dummies included in all
regressions. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the plant level
in round parentheses.
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have a negative impact on the productivity of domestic firms. Regarding the
remaining change in foreign presence,∆FIt, introducing the interaction terms
does not give a clearer picture of any eﬀect of these changes in foreign presence
on the productivity growth of domestic plants. Also with the interaction
terms included, the accumulated eﬀect of the∆F -terms remains insignificant.
In the third column of Table 3 we re-estimate column 2 using the Heck-
man selection model described above. The individual coeﬃcients have mostly
the same sign and significance level as in column 2. The result for the ac-
cumulated eﬀect of greenfield entry is stronger, i.e. more negative, while the
results on foreign acquisitions and the remaining change in foreign presence
are not aﬀected. Again conditioning selection on hazard variables and the
GIt, AIt and ∆FIt measures gives similar results.
As in the case of an overall change in foreign presence, we split the sam-
ple into low- and high-concentration sectors and estimate the regression of
column 1 in Table 3 on these two samples separately.19 The results for the
low-concentration sectors are presented in the first column of Table 4. The
eﬀect of greenfield entry is negative, while foreign acquisitions have a pos-
itive eﬀect on the productivity growth of domestic plants. As an example,
the coeﬃcient on the first lag of greenfield entry implies that a one percent-
age point increase in last year’s greenfield entry rate is associated with a
decrease in current productivity growth of 0.52 percent. From the second
column of Table 4 we find no significant eﬀect of greenfield foreign entrants
on productivity growth in high-concentration sectors. The eﬀect from for-
eign acquisitions in high-concentration sectors is ambiguous. The current
acquisition rate is positive and significant, whereas the second lag is nega-
tive and significant which results in an insignificant accumulated eﬀect. The
remaining change in foreign presence (∆F ) has a positive eﬀect, suggesting
a small spillover eﬀect from the foreign plants that are not recent entrants
into the sector. In small and transparent industries, the domestic firms may
be in a better position to appropriate knowledge from foreign firms and thus
benefit from spillovers. We obtain similar results as in Table 4 if we use the
Herfindahl index as an alternative measure of concentration and split the
sample at its median.
19Note that when splitting the sample at the median of CR5 = 0.25, the low-
concentration sample contains 18 of 132 5-digit sectors (7 of these are in the food sector
and 5 in the metal industry).
18
Table 4: Modes of Foreign Entry and Domestic Productivity in
Low- and High-Concentration Sectors
Dependent variable ∆ lnYit
(low conc) (high conc)
GI,t −.107 (.164) −.002 (.068)
GI,t−1 −.524 (.167)∗∗ .004 (.047)
GI,t−2 .050 (.192) −.024 (.057)
AI,t .046 (.034) .027 (.014)∗
AI,t−1 .074 (.032)∗ −.015 (.014)
AI,t−2 .124 (.033)∗∗ −.034 (.015)∗
∆FI,t .040 (.042) .012 (.019)
∆FI,t−1 −.017 (.046) .015 (.018)
∆FI,t−2 −.067 (.038)(∗) .032 (.017)(∗)P
GI
[p−value]
−.581
[.020]
−.022
[.819]P
AI
[p−value]
.244
[.000]
−.022
[.316]P
∆FI
[p−value]
−.044
[.447]
.060
[.034]
R2 .80 .79
N 34, 576 27, 353
Plants 3, 789 3, 028
Notes: ∗∗,∗ ,(∗) indicate significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% respectively. Coeﬃcients on inputs and
competition variables not reported. Year and
3-digit industry dummies included in all regres-
sions.Robust standard errors adjusted for cluster-
ing at the plant level in round parentheses.
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To summarise, we find a significant and positive eﬀect of an overall change
in foreign presence on the productivity growth of domestic plants in low-
concentration sectors. However, when focusing explicitly on foreign entrants,
we find that this is the result of two opposing eﬀects from the recent foreign
entrants. Greenfield entry has a negative impact on the productivity growth
of domestic plants in less concentrated industries. Entry via acquisition af-
fects domestic productivity growth positively. The eﬀect of greenfield entry
is stronger in absolute terms than that of acquisitions, but since foreign ac-
quisition is the most frequent mode of entry, the acquisition eﬀect dominates
in the eﬀect of an overall change in foreign presence (cf. Table 2).
For the low-concentration industries, the negative eﬀect of greenfield entry
on productivity could be due to a market stealing eﬀect as argued by Aitken
and Harrison (1999). When repeating the regression of column 1 in Table 4
without controlling for the use of inputs, we find that the accumulated eﬀect
of greenfield entry in the low-concentration sectors is stronger on output
(−1.549 [.001]) than on productivity (−0.581 [.020] from column 1 of Table
4). Given that our data do not contain information about prices, we do
not know whether this is primarily a price or a quantity eﬀect. Using profit
margins as the left-hand side variable instead of output, with the remaining
competition variables as right-hand side controls, yields no strong evidence of
a price eﬀect: two of the coeﬃcients on GI are positive while one is negative
and the accumulated coeﬃcient for the GIt variables is not significant (.122
[.350]). We also looked at how greenfield entry aﬀects the use of materials
and labour by using the change in these inputs as our dependent variable
while controlling for competition in addition to the foreign entry variables on
the right-hand side. These regressions give accumulated coeﬃcients on
P
GIt
equal to (−1.706 [.021]) for material inputs and (−.802 [.134]) for hours, and
none of the individual coeﬃcients on the GI-terms were significant. Thus it
seems that plants in low-concentration sectors are able to reduce their use
of materials as their output falls due to greenfield entry, but the negative
eﬀect on labour use is not significant. All in all, we take these results as
suggesting that the transitory decline in productivity growth that seems to
follow greenfield entry in sectors with low concentration rates is primarily
caused by the domestic firms not suﬃciently adjusting their use of labour in
the short run.
Turning to the eﬀect of foreign entry by acquisition, our results show
that acquisitions are associated with higher productivity growth for domestic
plants in low-concentration sectors, with the largest eﬀect 2 years after entry.
Given that we did not expect any (immediate) changes in market structure in
the acquisition case, it is plausible that we do not find a negative competition
eﬀect. In fact, foreign acquisitions appear to give the existing firms in the
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market time to adapt, possibly because they are themselves handicapped by
substantial in-house restructuring after a takeover. In addition, established
links from the acquired plant to other domestic plants may serve as a channel
for knowledge spillovers.
5 Robustness Analysis
In Table 5, we report the results for a number of robustness checks. The
regressions in the upper panel of Table 5 are all variations of equation (3) as
reported in column 2 of Table 3. In the lower panel of the table we report the
same variations of equation (3) on the sample of low-concentration sectors,
thus the results in the lower panel are comparable to column 1 of Table 4.
We only report the sum of coeﬃcients on GI , AI and ∆FI .20
In columns 1 and 7 of Table 5, we report the results of a more general
specification of equation (3) in which we allow the coeﬃcients on inputs to
vary across 3-digit industries by interacting the inputs with industry dum-
mies. Our specifications in Tables 3 and 4 constrain the input elasticities to
be the same for all manufacturing industries. This might disregard impor-
tant diﬀerences between industries and thus bias our estimates of the eﬀects
of foreign entry. However, the overall eﬀects of foreign entry and acquisitions
are very similar to the results reported in column 2 of Table 3 and column 1
of Table 4.
Production function estimation has been shown to yield poor results when
important unobservables that vary both across plants and over time, such as
productivity shocks, are omitted. This suggests that diﬀerencing and con-
trolling for plant fixed eﬀects may yield poor estimates of input use and,
moreover, it may not be suﬃcient to render the error term εit in equation
(1) white noise. Olley and Pakes (1996) show that such unobservable shocks
can be proxied for by investment behavior, on the assumption that these
shocks influence current investment, but - since investment takes time - not
current output. Their approach requires that plants do not undertake zero
investment, which is not the case for about 25% of the observations in our
sample. Instead, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose using intermediate in-
puts rather than investment to address the underlying simultaneity problem.
To make sure that our results are not aﬀected by this problem, we estimate
total factor productivity (TFP) as the residuals of a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function at the 2-digit level according to the Levinsohn-Petrin method.21
20Detailed results are available from the authors on request.
21In the absence of an appropriate deflator we use the share of energy in material use
to proxy for unobserved productivity shocks.
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Table 5: Robustness
Dep. var. ∆ lnYit ∆ ln TFPit ∆ TFPit ∆ ln LPit ∆ lnYit ∆ lnYit
Check 3-digit levpet translog labour Direct Majority
inp. coeﬀ. residuals index prod. foreign foreign
Full sample with concentration interactions (cf. Table 3 col (2))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)P
GI
[p−value]
−1.066
[.000]
−1.107
[.000]
−1.324
[.000]
−1.551
[.001]
−1.438
[.041]
−2.342
[.001]P
AI
[p−value]
.199
[.000]
.206
[.000]
.206
[.000]
.124
[.174]
.242
[.003]
.207
[.001]P
∆FI
[p−value]
−.016
[.810]
.086
[.214]
.032
[.617]
−.109
[.430]
−.021
[.809]
−.091
[.373]
R2 .81 .06 .07 .03 .79 .79
N 61, 929 61, 922 61, 924 61, 929 61, 929 61, 929
Plants 6, 558 6, 558 6, 558 6, 558 6, 558 6, 558
Low-concentration sectors only (cf. Table 4 col (low conc))
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)P
GI
[p−value]
−.698
[.003]
−.574
[.025]
−1.062
[.000]
−.747
[.112]
−.494
[.308]
−1.641
[.002]P
AI
[p−value]
.264
[.000]
.272
[.000]
.247
[.000]
−.063
[.478]
.353
[.001]
.160
[.006]P
∆FI
[p−value]
−.066
[.244]
.008
[.896]
−.049
[.368]
−.092
[.444]
−.150
[.123]
−.238
[.012]
R2 .81 .07 .08 .03 .80 .80
N 34, 576 34, 574 34, 576 34, 576 34, 576 34, 576
Plants 3, 789 3, 789 3, 789 3, 789 3, 789 3, 789
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In columns 2 and 8 of Table 5 we report the results of using this measure
as our dependent variable in estimating equation (3) omitting the inputs on
the right hand side. The results are similar to our original specifications.
In columns 3 and 9 we use as our measure of productivity growth a su-
perlative index of total factor productivity growth used by Aghion et al.
(2005), which is derived from a flexible translog specification of the produc-
tion technology, see Caves et al. (1982a, 1982b).22 The results from using
this measure are very similar to those of the specification in Table 3. The
accumulated eﬀect of greenfield entry is stronger in absolute terms. In col-
umn 4 and 10 of Table 5 we report results for labour productivity. Labour
productivity will not be aﬀected by potentially poor measurement or poor
estimation of the capital stock variable. Also here, the results for greenfield
entry point in the same direction as our previous results; but the eﬀect of
acquisitions is not significant.
As noted in Section 3, from 1990 onwards our definition of foreign own-
ership includes both directly and indirectly foreign-owned plants. We re-
estimate our original specifications with our foreign entry and acquisition
variables based on, respectively, direct foreign ownership at the 20% thresh-
old in columns 5 and 11 of Table 5, and on majority foreign ownership (direct
+ indirect) in columns 6 and 12. In both cases the coeﬃcients on greenfield
entry in the upper panel (columns 5 and 6) are negative and stronger than in
the reference equation, and this also holds for majority foreign greenfield en-
try in the low-concentration sectors (column 12). This is in line with earlier
results suggesting that the eﬀects from majority foreign-owned enterprises
are largest (e.g. Smarzynska Javorcik and Spatareanu (2003)). Overall, we
conclude that our results are not sensitive to how foreign ownership is defined
or to the measure of total factor productivity used.
6 Conclusions
Our aim in this paper was to bring new insights into the spillover debate
by distinguishing between new and existing foreign firms, and furthermore
between diﬀerent modes of foreign entry. In our data, an overall change
in foreign presence has a small positive impact on productivity growth of
domestic plants in low-concentration sectors, and no eﬀect in more concen-
trated sectors. The eﬀect in low-concentration sectors is generated by the
recent foreign entrants, with opposite eﬀects from greenfield entrants and for-
eign acquisitions. The impact of greenfield entry on domestic productivity
22Details on the construction of this index are presented in the Appendix.
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growth is negative in low-concentration sectors. The negative eﬀect of green-
field entry on the productivity growth of domestic plants in low-concentration
sectors seems to be primarily due to these plants not adjusting their use of in-
puts (in particular labour) in the short run. The negative competition eﬀect
associated with greenfield entry in low-concentration sectors is not found for
acquisitions. We find a positive eﬀect of foreign acquisitions on the produc-
tivity growth of domestic plants in these industries, with the largest eﬀect 2
years after entry. This suggests that established links from the acquired plant
to other domestic plants may serve as a channel for knowledge spillovers. In
highly concentrated sectors we find no significant eﬀect of either of the recent
entrants on domestic productivity growth.
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A Appendix
Table 6: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Levels
lnYit 9.522 1.230 4.304 14.521 61,929
lnKit 7.257 1.253 1.792 12.300 61,929
lnMit 8.694 1.440 0.417 14.402 61,929
lnHit 3.368 1.070 -3.937 8.593 61,929
MSit 0.017 0.047 0 1 61,929
PMit 0.140 0.094 0 0.918 61,929
investment 0 0 -0.007 0.020 61,929
CR5It 0.674 0.260 0.091 1 2,581
HHIIt 0.193 0.173 0.007 1 2,581
OPENIt 0.645 0.192 0.034 0.956 2,581
turnoverIt 0.069 0.080 0 1 2,581
FPIt 0.203 0.257 0 0.987 2,581
GIt 0.002 0.020 0 0.734 2,581
AIt 0.024 0.091 0 0.951 2,581
FIt 0.177 0.243 0 0.987 2,581
Diﬀerences
∆ lnYit 0.012 0.313 -6.203 4.246 61,929
∆ lnKit 0.034 0.319 -4.395 3.517 61,929
∆ lnMit 0.025 0.428 -7.014 6.110 61,929
∆ lnHit -0.012 0.342 -7.336 7.293 61,929
∆MSit 0 0.012 -0.684 0.688 61,929
∆PMit -0.003 0.085 -0.857 0.831 61,929
Note: Summary statistics for industry level variables are reported for
5-digit industry-year cells.
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Data and Variable Definitions
AIt Employment in plants that were acquired by a foreign owner between
years t and t− 1 as a share of 5-digit industry employment in year t.
CR5It Joint market share of the 5 largest plants in a 5-digit industry in
terms of output relative to industry output.
FIt Employment in foreign-owned plants present in year t and in year t− 1
as a share of 5-digit industry employment in year t.
FPIt Employment in foreign-owned plants as a share of 5-digit industry em-
ployment in year t.
GIt Employment in foreign-owned plants present in year t but not in year
t− 1 as a share of 5-digit industry employment in year t.
Hit Number of person hours in the plant. Since only blue-collar hours are
reported prior to 1983, and only total hours from 1983, we estimate
total hours before 1983 by using information on the blue-collar share of
the total wage bill. Rented labour hours are calculated from the costs
of rented labour using the calculated average wage for own employees.
HHIIt Herfindahl-Hirschman index defined as the sum over the squares of
each plant’s market share in its 5-digit industry.
Kit Our estimate of capital services uses the following aggregation:
Kit = Rit + (0.07 + δm)V mit + (0.07 + δ
b)V bit,
where Rit is the cost of rented capital in the plant, V mit and V bit are the
estimated values of machinery and buildings at the beginning of the
year, δm = 0.06 and δb = 0.02 are the depreciation rates that we use.
We take the rate of return to capital to be 0.07. The values for depre-
ciation rates and the rate of return to capital are also used by Salvanes
and Førre (2003) using the same data. The estimated values of build-
ings and machinery are obtained from information on fire insurance
values. To reduce noise and avoid discarding too many observations
with missing fire insurance values, we smooth these values using the
perpetual inventory method. Fire insurance values are not recorded
after 1995, thus from 1996 we estimate capital values by adding invest-
ments and taking account of depreciation. Where possible, we also use
estimates of firm level capital values (distributed to the plant level ac-
cording to employment shares) as starting values for plants with entry
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after 1995. These capital values are obtained from recent work to im-
prove on capital estimates in Norwegian manufacturing (see Raknerud
et al. (2003)). We use separate price deflators for inputs and output
and for investment in buildings and machinery obtained from Statistics
Norway. The aggregation level for the price deflators is according to the
sector classification used in the National Accounts, which is somewhere
in between the 2- and 3-digit ISIC level.
LPit Labour productivity defined as output per hour.
Mit Total cost of materials used. Since this variable in the data includes
rented labour and capital, we subtract these and allocate them to the
labour and capital measures respectively.
MSit Plant output as a share of 5-digit industry output.
OPENIt Rate of imports over imports plus exports (OPENIt =MIt/(MIt+
XIt)). Import and export data are taken from the OECD ITCS Inter-
national Trade Data SITC Rev. 2 and have been converted to 3 digit
ISIC Rev. 2 codes using a conversion table provided by Maskus (1989).
The data are converted into NOK using the annual average exchange
rate provided in the International Financial Statistics.
PMit Net output less material and wage costs divided by 5-digit industry
output.
TurnoverIt (Total number of plants entering in year t + total number of
plants exiting in year t)/(Total number of plants in year t)
∆TFPit The measure of TFP growth is derived from a flexible translog spec-
ification of the production technology.
∆TFPit = ∆ lnYit −
P
z=M,K,H
fαzit∆ lnxzit, (6)
where xzit is the quantity used of factor z in plant i at time t. The Divisia
share fαzit is defined as fαzit = (αzit+αzit−1)/2 where αzit is the cost share of
factor z relative to total output value Y in plant i at time t. We impose
constant returns to scale. Since there could be substantial noise in the
observed factor shares αzit, we apply a smoothing procedure proposed by
Harrigan (1997). Assuming a translog production technology, constant
returns to scale (CRS), and standard market-clearing conditions, αzit
can be expressed as follows:
αzit = ψi + ϕIt +
P
z=M,H
ωIt ln(
xzit
xKit
) (7)
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where ψi is a plant-specific constant, ϕIt an industry-time-specific con-
stant and where we normalize relative to capital use to impose CRS. If
the observed factor shares deviate from the left-hand side of this equa-
tion by an i.i.d. measurement error term, then the parameters can be
estimated by running separate fixed eﬀects panel data regressions for
each industry I. We estimate equation (7) separately for each 3-digit
ISIC industry, and use the fitted values from (7) as the factor shares in
the calculation of (6).
Yit Gross production value net of sales taxes and subsidies.
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